Tuesday, March 30, 2004
Monday, March 29, 2004
Sunday, 3/28/04, on Meet the Press:
Russert: Did you vote for George Bush in 2000?
Clarke: No I did not.
Russert: Did you vote for Al Gore?
Clarke: Yes I did.
Wednesday Before the 9/11 Commission: Clarke: 'Let me talk about partisanship here, since you raise it. I've been accused of being a member of John Kerry's campaign team several times this week, including by the White House. So let's just lay that one to bed. I'm not working for the Kerry campaign. Last time I had to declare my party loyalty, it was to vote in the Virginia primary for president of the United States in the year 2000. And I asked for a Republican ballot. '
The Real Clear Politics web site's take: Clarke's statement before the 9/11 Commission was designed to leave the impression that he voted Republican in the 2000 Presidential race (in other words for George Bush), thereby innoculating himself against charges of partisanship. It's now clear this was a clever semantic ploy intended to mislead the public - and the Commissioners as well."
Russert: Did you vote for George Bush in 2000?
Clarke: No I did not.
Russert: Did you vote for Al Gore?
Clarke: Yes I did.
Wednesday Before the 9/11 Commission: Clarke: 'Let me talk about partisanship here, since you raise it. I've been accused of being a member of John Kerry's campaign team several times this week, including by the White House. So let's just lay that one to bed. I'm not working for the Kerry campaign. Last time I had to declare my party loyalty, it was to vote in the Virginia primary for president of the United States in the year 2000. And I asked for a Republican ballot. '
The Real Clear Politics web site's take: Clarke's statement before the 9/11 Commission was designed to leave the impression that he voted Republican in the 2000 Presidential race (in other words for George Bush), thereby innoculating himself against charges of partisanship. It's now clear this was a clever semantic ploy intended to mislead the public - and the Commissioners as well."
This is one of the most cogent arguments ever presented for the United States action in Iraq.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________COMMENTARY
An Essential War
By GEORGE P. SHULTZ
March 29, 2004; Page A18
We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)
In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.
In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terrorist threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.
Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.
What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.
The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with each other -- bilaterally or multilaterally -- to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.
Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.
* * *
I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.
All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in economic and political development; and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.
The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists. We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful pre-emption. Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the option of forceful pre-emption, you diminish the effectiveness of your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist attack as hideous as they are -- witness what just happened in Madrid -- the U.S. must be ready to pre-empt identified threats. And not at the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable harm.
Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic. They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.
The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.
That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.
They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.
This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant. After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his own people.
About 10 years later he started another war against another one of his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and then a fourth country in the region.
That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the world.
That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation -- Desert Storm -- to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place as a legitimate state in the international system. There was virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed out.
When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place. Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own people, he must give up his arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."
Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N. inspectors and produced his weapons and facilitated their destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace agreement ending the state of war between the international system and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of "all necessary force" against Iraq -- an authorization that at the end of Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled -- would be reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.
In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and to obstruct the inspection effort.
By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate. Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the U.N. resolutions.
In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Saddam to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to 1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated. President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December 1998.
But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days -- apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.
So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the inspectors reported that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.
From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat. All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.
President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of 9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S. made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the Security Council resolutions -- a long line of them -- to deal with Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.
That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on -- and on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem as one of restraining the U.S. -- a position that seemed to emerge from France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N. resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or go into action. This of course was impossible militarily, politically, and financially.
Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:
• There has never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interests in ways that defy and endanger the international state system.
• The international legal case against Saddam -- 17 resolutions -- was unprecedented.
• The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N. inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international peace and security.
• Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse, or otherwise deal with his arsenal.
• He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N. resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his compliance.
• President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, the original bases for military action against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to adhere to the principles of international law and international organization within the international system. In the end, it was the U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.
* * *
The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material -- and of how we discovered these developments before they got completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As Dr. David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, "We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened."
When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: "The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons."
Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations -- including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale -- behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.
Sept. 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network.
If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.
Mr. Shultz, a former secretary of state, is a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This is adapted from his Kissinger Lecture, given recently at the Library of Congress.
URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108052892146167601,00.html
Copyright 2004 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________COMMENTARY
An Essential War
By GEORGE P. SHULTZ
March 29, 2004; Page A18
We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)
In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We thought we made some progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didn't really understand what motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.
In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terrorist threat was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective. Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years! Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the prisoner go free on procedural grounds.
Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with expertise, for sale.
What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.
The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with each other -- bilaterally or multilaterally -- to accomplish ends that transcend their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not govern them.
Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it. While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society, protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing for the common defense.
* * *
I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations for a world of states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.
All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in economic and political development; and take care that international organizations work for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.
The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists. We now call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to act on both offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the enemy hits you. The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence and prevention are all made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful pre-emption. Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives; they are complements. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. But if you deny yourself the option of forceful pre-emption, you diminish the effectiveness of your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist attack as hideous as they are -- witness what just happened in Madrid -- the U.S. must be ready to pre-empt identified threats. And not at the last moment, when an attack is imminent and more difficult to stop, but before the terrorist gets in position to do irreparable harm.
Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a "failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the U.N. as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic. They talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way the world works, to the international state system.
The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and al Qaeda's rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas where the state's authority does not run.
That's one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong Il of North Korea is another.
They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this, and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system, they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.
This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant. After Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one of his neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed war crimes including the use of chemical weapons, even against his own people.
About 10 years later he started another war against another one of his neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war crimes. He took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and then a fourth country in the region.
That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The aggressors in wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy the defeated country, or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought to wipe out the defeated state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the world.
That got the world's attention. That's why, at the U.N., the votes were wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation -- Desert Storm -- to throw Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place as a legitimate state in the international system. There was virtually universal recognition that those responsible for the international system of states could not let a state simply be rubbed out.
When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place. Then the U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him from continuing to start wars and commit crimes against his own people, he must give up his arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."
Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N. inspectors and produced his weapons and facilitated their destruction, then the cease-fire would be transformed into a peace agreement ending the state of war between the international system and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and materially breached his obligations regarding his weapons of mass destruction, then the original U.N. Security Council authorization for the use of "all necessary force" against Iraq -- an authorization that at the end of Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled -- would be reactivated and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led military action against him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.
In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of it. They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force declined, Saddam's cooperation declined. He began to play games and to obstruct the inspection effort.
By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections impossible. President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam would have to comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American military force. Kofi Annan flew to Baghdad and returned with a new promise of cooperation from Saddam. But Saddam did not cooperate. Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its unanimous consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed use of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the U.N. resolutions.
In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Saddam to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to 1991. That meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original authorization for the use of force against Saddam was reactivated. President Clinton ordered American forces into action in December 1998.
But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four days -- apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.
So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the inspectors reported that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major quantities of WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in chemical and biological weapons and the means of delivering them by missiles. All the intelligence services of the world agreed on this.
From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to do what he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international system had given up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat. All through the years between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act and speak and to rule Iraq as a rogue state.
President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of 9/11, that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious that the world could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S. made the decision to continue to work within the scope of the Security Council resolutions -- a long line of them -- to deal with Saddam. After an extended and excruciating diplomatic effort, the Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441, which gave Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear that Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his obligations under international law. His report, thousands of pages long, did not in any way account for the remaining weapons of mass destruction that the U.N. inspectors had reported to be in existence as of the end of 1998. That assessment was widely agreed upon.
That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on -- and on. And as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being kept on Iraq and Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem as one of restraining the U.S. -- a position that seemed to emerge from France's aspirations for greater influence in Europe and elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear that French diplomacy had resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union, and the Security Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would not face the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N. resolutions because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on Iraq's borders ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its troops poised there for an indeterminate time to come, until presumably France would instruct us that we could either withdraw or go into action. This of course was impossible militarily, politically, and financially.
Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood:
• There has never been a clearer case of a rogue state using its privileges of statehood to advance its dictator's interests in ways that defy and endanger the international state system.
• The international legal case against Saddam -- 17 resolutions -- was unprecedented.
• The intelligence services of all involved nations and the U.N. inspectors over more than a decade all agreed that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to international peace and security.
• Saddam had four undisturbed years to augment, conceal, disperse, or otherwise deal with his arsenal.
• He used every means to avoid cooperating or explaining what he has done with them. This refusal in itself was, under the U.N. resolutions, adequate grounds for resuming the military operation against him that had been put in abeyance in 1991 pending his compliance.
• President Bush, in ordering U.S. forces into action, stated that we were doing so under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 678 and 687, the original bases for military action against Saddam Hussein in 1991. Those who criticize the U.S. for unilateralism should recognize that no nation in the history of the United Nations has ever engaged in such a sustained and committed multilateral diplomatic effort to adhere to the principles of international law and international organization within the international system. In the end, it was the U.S. that upheld and acted in accordance with the U.N. resolutions on Iraq, not those on the Security Council who tried to stop us.
* * *
The question of weapons of mass destruction is just that: a question that remains to be answered, a mystery that must be solved. Just as we also must solve the mystery of how Libya and Iran developed menacing nuclear capability without detection, of how we were caught unaware of a large and flourishing black market in nuclear material -- and of how we discovered these developments before they got completely out of hand and have put in place promising corrective processes. The question of Iraq's presumed stockpile of weapons will be answered, but that answer, however it comes out, will not affect the fully justifiable and necessary action that the coalition has undertaken to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq. As Dr. David Kay put it in a Feb. 1 interview with Chris Wallace, "We know there were terrorist groups in state still seeking WMD capability. Iraq, although I found no weapons, had tremendous capabilities in this area. A marketplace phenomena was about to occur, if it did not occur; sellers meeting buyers. And I think that would have been very dangerous if the war had not intervened."
When asked by Mr. Wallace what the sellers could have sold if they didn't have actual weapons, Mr. Kay said: "The knowledge of how to make them, the knowledge of how to make small amounts, which is, after all, mostly what terrorists want. They don't want battlefield amounts of weapons. No, Iraq remained a very dangerous place in terms of WMD capabilities, even though we found no large stockpiles of weapons."
Above all, and in the long run, the most important aspect of the Iraq war will be what it means for the integrity of the international system and for the effort to deal effectively with terrorism. The stakes are huge and the terrorists know that as well as we do. That is the reason for their tactic of violence in Iraq. And that is why, for us and for our allies, failure is not an option. The message is that the U.S. and others in the world who recognize the need to sustain our international system will no longer quietly acquiesce in the take-over of states by lawless dictators who then carry on their depredations -- including the development of awesome weapons for threats, use, or sale -- behind the shield of protection that statehood provides. If you are one of these criminals in charge of a state, you no longer should expect to be allowed to be inside the system at the same time that you are a deadly enemy of it.
Sept. 11 forced us to comprehend the extent and danger of the challenge. We began to act before our enemy was able to extend and consolidate his network.
If we put this in terms of World War II, we are now sometime around 1937. In the 1930s, the world failed to do what it needed to do to head off a world war. Appeasement never works. Today we are in action. We must not flinch. With a powerful interplay of strength and diplomacy, we can win this war.
Mr. Shultz, a former secretary of state, is a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. This is adapted from his Kissinger Lecture, given recently at the Library of Congress.
URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108052892146167601,00.html
Copyright 2004 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Saturday, March 27, 2004
I'm looking forward to Congressman Shays next appearance on television Winds of Change.NET: Shays on Clarke
The more you look at his record, his record reflects the worst...on Clarke.
The more you look at his record, his record reflects the worst...on Clarke.
Charles Krauthammer its the nail on the head in this column Charles Krauthammer: Partisan Clarke
I think that Clarke enjoyed being President Clinton's source for the information Clinton received on terrorism, while knowingly or unknowingly insulating Clinton from criticism that he (Clinton) wasn't listening to his intelligence chiefs. Clinton could make public comments that implied toughness while remaining happily tied down by bureaucratic procedures involving DOJ, State, DOD and the NSC. Clarke blamed NSC chief Rice for his loss of direct access to the President under the Bush Administration. When Clarke did brief the President in a 1:1 meeting, his presentation centered on cyberterror, not bombings or hijackings. Clarke's knowledge of cyberterror has been found wanting by those in the know
Clarke appears to be a thin-skinned bureaucratic bully, skilled in playing and being played as long as he perceives the game is one he can win. However, by "sexing up" his charges against the Bush Administration in his book and before the 9/11 Commission while giving Clinton a pass, he's angered members of the Congressional Leadership enough that they may declassify portions of his testimony before Congress. While further besmirching his credibility--the small amount that remains--he could face Contempt of Congress charges. I find the legal danger somewhat unlikely, but Clarke is likely to wind up wishing he'd played it straight.
I think that Clarke enjoyed being President Clinton's source for the information Clinton received on terrorism, while knowingly or unknowingly insulating Clinton from criticism that he (Clinton) wasn't listening to his intelligence chiefs. Clinton could make public comments that implied toughness while remaining happily tied down by bureaucratic procedures involving DOJ, State, DOD and the NSC. Clarke blamed NSC chief Rice for his loss of direct access to the President under the Bush Administration. When Clarke did brief the President in a 1:1 meeting, his presentation centered on cyberterror, not bombings or hijackings. Clarke's knowledge of cyberterror has been found wanting by those in the know
Clarke appears to be a thin-skinned bureaucratic bully, skilled in playing and being played as long as he perceives the game is one he can win. However, by "sexing up" his charges against the Bush Administration in his book and before the 9/11 Commission while giving Clinton a pass, he's angered members of the Congressional Leadership enough that they may declassify portions of his testimony before Congress. While further besmirching his credibility--the small amount that remains--he could face Contempt of Congress charges. I find the legal danger somewhat unlikely, but Clarke is likely to wind up wishing he'd played it straight.
Thursday, March 25, 2004
Gee, who would've thought that this analysis would have come from this source TIME.com: Richard Clarke, at War With Himself
After reading Rich Lowry's column Rich Lowry on Richard Clarke on National Review Online, I had these thoughts on the Clinton Administration's attitude on terrorism:
It is possible that President Clinton was fixated on trying to "Carterize" his legacy by moving the Middle East peace process forward at the end of his administration, and may well have been "distracted" due to his laser-like focus on the process (viewed somewhat favorably from Clinton's perspective) from rolling up al Qaeda. Perhaps his calculation was that an attack on al Qaeda wouldn't go down well with the Palestinians and their Arab allies, potentially sidetracking his effort. After all, the President hadn't really been called on the carpet for his failures to deal with terrorism; why worry now over the lives of a few sailors?
Also, it seems to me that the Clinton national security team was much more focused on process than results. Each new attack seemed to completely reset their deliberations, not add urgency and impetus towards an effective response.
One takeaway that these hearings have left me with is that another of the great failings of Clinton was his lack of faith in his ability to truly lead the American people towards an unpopular goal. Perhaps some of his advisors may have argued for reforms akin to the Patriot Act; some may have argued for more aggressive changes in diplomacy towards Pakistan and the other former Soviet countries surrounding Afghanistan that provided basing and other support after 9/11. He could have fired generals and/or his CIA, FBI and DOJ heads--anyone who wasn't pulling their weight towards solving the problem rather than finding excuses for inaction. He could have ordered a KH-11 to be tasked permanently over Afghanistan to watch for UBL instead of depending on the Predator and its limitations. He could have done a thousand things to demonstrate action over symbolism--his calculus seemed to be that the latter is always good enough for his image.
It is possible that President Clinton was fixated on trying to "Carterize" his legacy by moving the Middle East peace process forward at the end of his administration, and may well have been "distracted" due to his laser-like focus on the process (viewed somewhat favorably from Clinton's perspective) from rolling up al Qaeda. Perhaps his calculation was that an attack on al Qaeda wouldn't go down well with the Palestinians and their Arab allies, potentially sidetracking his effort. After all, the President hadn't really been called on the carpet for his failures to deal with terrorism; why worry now over the lives of a few sailors?
Also, it seems to me that the Clinton national security team was much more focused on process than results. Each new attack seemed to completely reset their deliberations, not add urgency and impetus towards an effective response.
One takeaway that these hearings have left me with is that another of the great failings of Clinton was his lack of faith in his ability to truly lead the American people towards an unpopular goal. Perhaps some of his advisors may have argued for reforms akin to the Patriot Act; some may have argued for more aggressive changes in diplomacy towards Pakistan and the other former Soviet countries surrounding Afghanistan that provided basing and other support after 9/11. He could have fired generals and/or his CIA, FBI and DOJ heads--anyone who wasn't pulling their weight towards solving the problem rather than finding excuses for inaction. He could have ordered a KH-11 to be tasked permanently over Afghanistan to watch for UBL instead of depending on the Predator and its limitations. He could have done a thousand things to demonstrate action over symbolism--his calculus seemed to be that the latter is always good enough for his image.
Wednesday, March 24, 2004
Tuesday, March 23, 2004
Dick Clarke: channeler of Alexander Haig, as chronicled here New York Post Online Edition: postopinion
I missed Richard Clarke's interview on 60 Minutes yesterday. I watched his interview with Charlie Rose on his (Rose's) PBS show tonight. Here are the key points that I took away:
1) He believes that if the Bush Administration had heeded his advice, the FBI may have apprehended 2 of the 19 9/11 hijackers, possibly disrupting the plot--perhaps causing one of the four teams to abort.
2) The Bush Administration used too few troops in Afghanistan to cut off and capture bin Laden.
3) George Tenent of the CIA may privately agree with him, but probably won't say so until after he leaves government service.
4) He won't serve in a Kerry Administration, should we be cursed with same.
5) Had the Bush Administration followed his advice...had it not gone to war with Iraq (I'm not totally clear that he advised anyone on totally avoiding war with Iraq)...our security situation would be much better.
6) No one in the Bush Administration lied, but they came close to doing so.
My take on his assertions:
1) Pre-9/11, the Bush Administration was still operating under the Clinton Administration's dictum that the FBI and the CIA could not cooperate at the operational level to share information that could be used in domestic counterintelligence. Clarke says that Clinton officials had held high level meetings to "shake the tree" to get such information out that Clarke claims thwarted terrorist attacks going back to 1996. At least, that's the impression that he gave--that Clinton's NSC Director, Sandy Berger, was ignoring or countermanding Reno's order so that better inter-agency coordination could take place. He apparently feels that Condi Rice, Bush's NSC Director, should have listened to him and done the same. The Bush Administration says that the chatter that the intelligence services picked up in the first 8 months of 2001 indicated that attacks would come against US or allied interests overseas, not domestically. I don't know what other arguments he used in classified meetings with Administration officials, but it sounds like they were alert to a threat. Clarke doesn't deal with the issue of the FBI bureaucracy's poor handling of a low-level agent's reports on the terrorists' activities. Apparently, no chatter alerted anyone to activities involving aircraft, and still fewer "experts" would have believed that the goal of the terrorists was to crash the planes instead of holding the passengers as hostages. He seems to be on shaky ground.
2) I expect that Secretary Rumsfeld will comment on the Afghanistan strategy at some point. I believe--based on my reading of history--that the Bush Administration was mindful of the failure of the Soviet Union to conquer the country, despite deploying over 100,000 troops and planting one of the largest minefields in history. Fifteen thousand Soviet troops died during the 10-year conflict. The USSR withdrew in 1989 after reaching a face-saving agreement with the US that called for the ending of US support for the Mujahidin. Afghanistan suffered huge losses during the conflict: almost one million Afghanis died; five million more were forced to leave their homes.
The US Special Ops/Air Force approach destroyed the Taliban and resulted in destroying or capturing 2/3 of the Al Qaeda leadership. Whether we would have suffered unacceptable losses in a more massive buildup--a buildup that would have taken much more time to transport and stage prior to invasion--is a question that Clarke wasn't asked. We cannot know whether more troops would have meant immediate capture of bin Laden given the terrain and weather conditions during the period of the war. Again, Clarke doth protest too much.
3) If Tenent turns on the President, he'll betray a man who stood by him when many in Congress and around the country were (and are) looking for a head to chop off. The "failure" of pre-Iraq war intelligence arguments pointed to Tenent and his daily briefings of the President as a scapegoat for the "failure".
4) Good.
5) That's not clear. Clarke says that Dean was right, that we're no safer after the fall of Saddam. I disagree.
-- Saddam was corrupting the UN, and allied governments, to get sanctions lifted.
-- Saddam gave speeches (see the MEMRI site) praising his scientists for their research on nuclear weapons and other WMD programs. It appears that if he didn't have WMD programs, he had WMD experts in place ready to resume the programs once the sanctions were lifted.
-- Saddam hosted terrorist camps, and paid the families of Palestinian homicide bombers after their deaths in attacks on Israel.
-- Saddam was in a position to destabilize the supply of a crucial national resource used by the entire world--something he had done once before. He could damage the economies of the industrial world, and hold them hostage if he became powerful enough to stand against the West.
6) Don't think so. President Bush is a man who says what he means, and means what he says. I think that's true of the Vice President as well. No senior official would last long in this Administration if caught in a lie.
Richard Perle will appear on the Charlie Rose show tomorrow night to rebut Clarke's assertions. It should be a good one.
1) He believes that if the Bush Administration had heeded his advice, the FBI may have apprehended 2 of the 19 9/11 hijackers, possibly disrupting the plot--perhaps causing one of the four teams to abort.
2) The Bush Administration used too few troops in Afghanistan to cut off and capture bin Laden.
3) George Tenent of the CIA may privately agree with him, but probably won't say so until after he leaves government service.
4) He won't serve in a Kerry Administration, should we be cursed with same.
5) Had the Bush Administration followed his advice...had it not gone to war with Iraq (I'm not totally clear that he advised anyone on totally avoiding war with Iraq)...our security situation would be much better.
6) No one in the Bush Administration lied, but they came close to doing so.
My take on his assertions:
1) Pre-9/11, the Bush Administration was still operating under the Clinton Administration's dictum that the FBI and the CIA could not cooperate at the operational level to share information that could be used in domestic counterintelligence. Clarke says that Clinton officials had held high level meetings to "shake the tree" to get such information out that Clarke claims thwarted terrorist attacks going back to 1996. At least, that's the impression that he gave--that Clinton's NSC Director, Sandy Berger, was ignoring or countermanding Reno's order so that better inter-agency coordination could take place. He apparently feels that Condi Rice, Bush's NSC Director, should have listened to him and done the same. The Bush Administration says that the chatter that the intelligence services picked up in the first 8 months of 2001 indicated that attacks would come against US or allied interests overseas, not domestically. I don't know what other arguments he used in classified meetings with Administration officials, but it sounds like they were alert to a threat. Clarke doesn't deal with the issue of the FBI bureaucracy's poor handling of a low-level agent's reports on the terrorists' activities. Apparently, no chatter alerted anyone to activities involving aircraft, and still fewer "experts" would have believed that the goal of the terrorists was to crash the planes instead of holding the passengers as hostages. He seems to be on shaky ground.
2) I expect that Secretary Rumsfeld will comment on the Afghanistan strategy at some point. I believe--based on my reading of history--that the Bush Administration was mindful of the failure of the Soviet Union to conquer the country, despite deploying over 100,000 troops and planting one of the largest minefields in history. Fifteen thousand Soviet troops died during the 10-year conflict. The USSR withdrew in 1989 after reaching a face-saving agreement with the US that called for the ending of US support for the Mujahidin. Afghanistan suffered huge losses during the conflict: almost one million Afghanis died; five million more were forced to leave their homes.
The US Special Ops/Air Force approach destroyed the Taliban and resulted in destroying or capturing 2/3 of the Al Qaeda leadership. Whether we would have suffered unacceptable losses in a more massive buildup--a buildup that would have taken much more time to transport and stage prior to invasion--is a question that Clarke wasn't asked. We cannot know whether more troops would have meant immediate capture of bin Laden given the terrain and weather conditions during the period of the war. Again, Clarke doth protest too much.
3) If Tenent turns on the President, he'll betray a man who stood by him when many in Congress and around the country were (and are) looking for a head to chop off. The "failure" of pre-Iraq war intelligence arguments pointed to Tenent and his daily briefings of the President as a scapegoat for the "failure".
4) Good.
5) That's not clear. Clarke says that Dean was right, that we're no safer after the fall of Saddam. I disagree.
-- Saddam was corrupting the UN, and allied governments, to get sanctions lifted.
-- Saddam gave speeches (see the MEMRI site) praising his scientists for their research on nuclear weapons and other WMD programs. It appears that if he didn't have WMD programs, he had WMD experts in place ready to resume the programs once the sanctions were lifted.
-- Saddam hosted terrorist camps, and paid the families of Palestinian homicide bombers after their deaths in attacks on Israel.
-- Saddam was in a position to destabilize the supply of a crucial national resource used by the entire world--something he had done once before. He could damage the economies of the industrial world, and hold them hostage if he became powerful enough to stand against the West.
6) Don't think so. President Bush is a man who says what he means, and means what he says. I think that's true of the Vice President as well. No senior official would last long in this Administration if caught in a lie.
Richard Perle will appear on the Charlie Rose show tomorrow night to rebut Clarke's assertions. It should be a good one.
Monday, March 22, 2004
Richard "Dick" Clarke certainly has changed his tune on the administration's approach to dealing with the threat of terrorism. National Review magazine's blog, The Corner, excerpts a portion of an interview PBS's Frontline program conducted with Clarke in 2002 The Corner on National Review Online
National Review also carries the text of a White House document that contains responses to charges Clarke now levels against the Administration here
CBS didn't chalk up any points for journalistic integrity by failing to mention that Clarke's book, like Paul O'Neill's book, were published by CBS's parent company, Viacom. The publishing subsidiary, Simon & Schuster, also publishes books by James Carville, Paul Begala and other Clinton-friendly authors.
National Review also carries the text of a White House document that contains responses to charges Clarke now levels against the Administration here
CBS didn't chalk up any points for journalistic integrity by failing to mention that Clarke's book, like Paul O'Neill's book, were published by CBS's parent company, Viacom. The publishing subsidiary, Simon & Schuster, also publishes books by James Carville, Paul Begala and other Clinton-friendly authors.
Read this http://www.lt-smash.us/archives/002759.html#002759
... then this http://www.lt-smash.us/archives/002760.html#002760
... and then this http://www.lt-smash.us/archives/002761.html#002761
These people don't mind ruling society under martial law, as long as they're the martials. I pray that they are never given the chance here. Their track record speaks for itself.
... then this http://www.lt-smash.us/archives/002760.html#002760
... and then this http://www.lt-smash.us/archives/002761.html#002761
These people don't mind ruling society under martial law, as long as they're the martials. I pray that they are never given the chance here. Their track record speaks for itself.
Monday, March 15, 2004
Sunday, March 14, 2004
Who knew that the 82nd Airborne has a men's chorus? The world's toughest "boy band" gave a great rendition of the national anthem at today's Nextel Cup event in Atlanta, followed by a slow flyover by a formation of 4 A-10 Warthogs. The Warthog is one of my favorite aircraft. This site A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt II - Military Aircraft contains a great deal of information on the best tank killer in service today. As the A-10 pilots proudly say, "Go ugly early".
In honor of St. Patrick's month
Danny Boy
Oh Danny boy, the pipes,
the pipes are calling
From glen to glen,
and down the mountain side
The summer's gone,
and all the flowers are falling
'Tis you, 'tis you
must go and I must bide
But come ye back
when summer's in the meadow
Or when the valley's hushed
and white with snow
And I'll be here
in sunshine or in shadow
Oh Danny boy, oh Danny boy,
I love you so
But if you come,
and all the flowers are falling
And I am dead,
as dead I may well be
You'll come and find
the place where I am lying
And kneel and say
an "Ave" there for me
And I will hear,
though soft your tread above me
And o'er my grave
will warmer sweeter be
And you will bend
and tell me that you love me
And I will sleep
in peace until you come to me
But if I live
and should you die for Ireland
Let not your dying thoughts
be just of me
But say a prayer to God
for our dearest Island
I know He'll hear
and help to set her free
And I will take your pike
and place my dearest
And strike a blow,
though weak the blow may be
Twill help the cause
to which your heart was nearest
Oh Danny Boy, Oh, Danny boy
I love you so.
Danny Boy
Oh Danny boy, the pipes,
the pipes are calling
From glen to glen,
and down the mountain side
The summer's gone,
and all the flowers are falling
'Tis you, 'tis you
must go and I must bide
But come ye back
when summer's in the meadow
Or when the valley's hushed
and white with snow
And I'll be here
in sunshine or in shadow
Oh Danny boy, oh Danny boy,
I love you so
But if you come,
and all the flowers are falling
And I am dead,
as dead I may well be
You'll come and find
the place where I am lying
And kneel and say
an "Ave" there for me
And I will hear,
though soft your tread above me
And o'er my grave
will warmer sweeter be
And you will bend
and tell me that you love me
And I will sleep
in peace until you come to me
But if I live
and should you die for Ireland
Let not your dying thoughts
be just of me
But say a prayer to God
for our dearest Island
I know He'll hear
and help to set her free
And I will take your pike
and place my dearest
And strike a blow,
though weak the blow may be
Twill help the cause
to which your heart was nearest
Oh Danny Boy, Oh, Danny boy
I love you so.
Saturday, March 13, 2004
After the terrorist attack on Spanish citizens on 3/11, it is worth rereading the remarks made by another world leader a few days after the seminal moment in America's battle with terrorism President Declares "Freedom at War with Fear"
¡Viva España!
¡Viva España!
Sunday, March 07, 2004
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