Unilateral disarmament

Kerry is trying to have it both ways.

He says that he is committed to winning in Iraq (during the debate)--except when he doesn't (the big speech on a Monday shortly before the debate).
He says that the President's DOE is wrong to do research on smaller nuclear weapons designed to be bunker busters. He says he'll cancel the program immediately because it sends the wrong message to countries that are trying to produce nuclear weapons--Iran and North Korea. Apparently we are in violation of the "do as I say, do as I do" rule.

Kerry also claimed that the program costs "hundreds of millions of dollars." The actual costs are less than forty million--much of our research is done on supercomputers that simulate the detonation without ever actually building and testing a bomb.

The President's program is right. The mullahs of Iran and the pot-bellied dictator of North Korea have shown that they aren't deterred by words. They apparently believed that the US was a paper tiger during the Clinton Administration, just as Iran showed the world that the Carter Administration foreign policy was. They thought that the US was physically incapable of and politically unwilling to use conventional force to act on its national interests, preferring to intercede in symbolic fashion without risking casualties.

That changed after 9/11. The victory in Afghanistan was shocking: sudden, overwhelming defeat where the British and the Soviets had failed in Afghanistan, using Special Forces, airpower, and indigenous troops with help from Pakistan and other non-traditional US allies. In Iraq, victory seemed certain, but the warnings that Saddam had and would use WMD were ominously issued by Arab leaders in Egypt and Jordan to General Franks beforehand. Chattering class "experts" cautioned against massive US casualties and civilian deaths. Many believed Saddam's propaganda that his army could rival the west's best, and that his troops were loyal. All those pre-war predictions and more were disproven.

Libya looked at the President's determination, and unilaterally surrendered its WMD program, allowing us to display it in Tennessee. Pakistan cooperated with our proliferation investigation, and the A. Q. Khan network that supplied nuclear weapons technology to third world states was rolled up. Initially, the Iranian mullahs and North Korea appeared willing to negotiate the demolition of their programs.

That has changed now. US political news reaches Pyongyang and Tehran. Instead of dismantling their programs, the political calculus in these capitals appears to be that their programs are symbols of strength against the uncertainty of the UN and the west, and that the existence of these programs weakens the President's chance for reelection. They see that Kerry will be bound to pass a "global test" before taking military action. They also believe that the US conventional force structure would not allow another invasion like Iraq.

Both North Korea and Iran have missile programs that, depending on the heat of the rhetoric of the day, may one day carry nuclear weapons, and may one day reach US allies and even the US Pacific coast. See http://www.strategypage.com/fyeo/howtomakewar/default.asp?target=HTICBM.HTM Iran is a customer of North Korea's, and apparently is attempting to obtain long range missile technology from Russia if it can get it.
Attacking the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea will be difficult. Iran has placed its nuclear program in populated centers, at least in some cases. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/nuke-fac.htm and http://cns.miis.edu/research/iran/nucsites.htm North Korea has also attempted to disperse and hide its nuclear facilities. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm and http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/fac/research/NKN_F_ynrcen_GO.html

Both have also seen the effects of US airpower on Saddam's ability to control his army, and are designing their own command and control emplacements to reduce their vulnerability to an aerial attack. See http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/c3i.htm for an overview of Korea's approach, and http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-strikes.htm. Note that Iran's facility at Natanz may be buried deep enough and hardened enough to resist almost any conventional bunker buster weapon.

That brings us back to the question of bunker buster weapons. The US has a program to evaluate the capabilities and usage of several approaches to the use of nuclear weapons for this purpose against those of conventional weapons to produce something called the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator" http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/rnep.htm Although Senators Fienstein and Kennedy opposed the program on the Senate floor, it was successfully defended http://domenici.senate.gov/legislation/record.cfm?id=224732 and passed.

No one can say that the "RNEP" can be used without causing fallout and unacceptable collateral damage. One fact is certain: if concepts like the RNEP are not studied, we are almost certain to be "self-deterred". Our existing nuclear arsenal is made up of weapons that are frankly too big to be used, and probably doesn't intimidate either North Korea or Iran from continuing their research into and possible construction of a small quantity of nuclear weapons. It may be possible for one or both of those members of the Axis of Evil to reconstitute the equivalent of the A. Q. Khan network--perhaps with the addition of actual complete weapons for sale.

Diplomacy is by far the preferred way to deal with North Korea and Iran. However, there must be a credible threat of force that the US can make to protect its vital interests. The range of options should not be arbitrarily limited, although the political opposition to a nuclear first strike would be extremely difficult to overcome without a far higher burden of proof than existed for Iraq or Afghanistan. Still, most Americans do not wish to see us sit by and allow the tools of nuclear blackmail to fall into the wrong hands without having the tools in hand to oppose them. The President can argue that a conventional attack on one or both Axis members could be met with a nuclear response from the Axis simply because they could repel a US attack conventionally, and that a nuclear showdown with the US over our national interests may happen sooner than later. Perhaps demands for the withdrawal of all coalition forces from Iraq, or demands for the removal of US forces from Japan and South Korea.

The RNEP or an effective conventional equivalent that would work as a "surgical strike tool" to remove North Korean or Iranian nuclear weapons, missiles, manufacturing sites, and command & control facilities without a full-scale invasion would be a major deterrent to the Axis. Having that option may serve as a stabilizing influence on negotiations--the Axis would know that the US and its allies could attack to remove their nuclear and missile infrastructure successfully should the Axis attempt to use such weapons or blackmail the US with their us.

We should not unilaterally disarm and remove the President's--or a future President's--ability to counter threats from the Axis. Such a move would be reckless, and would ignore the proven effectiveness of the so-called "MAD" deterrence that served to keep the Cold War from turning hot for decades. Only one who advocated a "Nuclear Freeze" in the 1980s would advocate a self-defeating move before the fact, in effect destabilizing the balance of power between the Axis and the free world.

Nice to see one of my favorite warplanes all Photoshopped up and ready to drop some 30mm DU candy on Islamofascists everywhere. Evil pundit of doom!: Top Bun

I draw the line at changing the key line in the Air Force hymn to "Nothing can stop the US Hare Force"!

Fox News has done some fine reporting on the UN Oil-for-Food scandal. The UN has taken exception to parts of its latest report. Here's a response from Fox News with links to the original reports and the UN's response to them. FOX News Responds to U.N. Comments