The two articles immediately below remind me of how much Johnson and Kerry seem to approach warfare alike. Vietnam was the first conflict that offered near real-time communication with the field. Johnson could obtain very fresh information, and with it, issue orders that never would have been possible in Roosevelt's or Truman's day. Johnson thought by starting and halting bombing operations the North Vietnamese understood that he was sending messages. It is apparent today that the North Vietnamese saw his moves as signs of weakness to be exploited, and opportunities to rearm, to propagandize the population of North and South Vietnam alike to hearten the former and demoralize the latter.

When Kerry talks about how he would have managed Tora Bora, he sounds Johnsonian. He sounds like a man who, based on his vast experience as a Lieutenant (Junior Grade), he would make tactical decisions on the conduct of war on the ground. General Franks, meet General Kerry.

I believe that our Afghanistan campaign was successful precisely because we learned from the mistakes that the British and the Soviets made. We did not commit hundreds of thousands of troops and aircraft to the theater. We did not have to support a huge supply line across thousands of miles of terrain to reach the unforgiving land-locked terrain of eastern Afghanistan. We followed successful Special Forces doctrine and trained the indigenous population to fight for themselves. We used our technological advantages in conjunction with air power to provide close air support, often using B-52 and B-1B bombers as effective as massed artillery.

I believe that these things were possible because President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld demanded unconventional thinking, but left the execution of the war plan to the officers and men on the ground. I worry that Kerry would try to over manage Iraq--as well as the next challenge--and make manners worse as Johnson did.